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Abstract: 
 
We consider a model with a vertically integrated monopolist network provider who 
faces rival operators in the retail market. We examine the network operator’s incentives 
to invest in a technology that increases demand. We find that investments are below the 
social optimum even when there is no regulation, and access price regulation further 
reduces investment incentives. The underinvestment problem may have negative effects 
on the viability of competition and in the presence of access price regulation, rivals are 
most likely to be foreclosed when they would bring highest benefits to consumers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Introducing competition into local telecommunications has been an important goal of 
industrial policy in many European countries since the 1980s. Despite liberalisation, the 
market share of the incumbent telecommunications operator in the local telecommunications 
market in all European countries was above 80 % and in most of them well above 90 % at the 
end of the 1990s1. The question of determining the correct price at which one 
telecommunications operator can use the infrastructure of another, that is the access price, has 
been identified as a central issue in the attempt to make the liberalised telecommunications 
markets truly competitive. The principles of network access pricing in a static context have 
indeed been the subject of extensive research, which has been surveyed by Laffont and Tirole 
(2000) and Armstrong (2002). However, the important question of how access price 
regulation affects firms’ incentives for investment has so far received much less attention in 
the literature.   
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of access price regulation on a network 
provider’s incentives to invest in its infrastructure. These infrastructure investments are 
assumed to increase customers’ willingness to pay for final telecommunications services. We 
consider a vertically integrated incumbent who provides network access to rival operators in 
the retail sector. The network is assumed to have natural monopoly characteristics and it is 
therefore an essential input in the production of telecommunications services. The assumption 
of a monopoly network can be justified by the current situation in many countries. Further, in 
a recent study by Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000), it was found that the provision of access 
to broadband telecommunications networks is likely to remain a naturally monopolistic 
activity at least in less densely populated areas.  
 
We examine the incumbent’s investment decision both when there is no regulation and when 
the access price is regulated. We assume that the access charge is the only instrument 
available for the regulator. This assumption corresponds closely to current practice in the EU, 
as the new regulatory framework for electronic communications emphasises that retail level 
regulatory controls are only justified if wholesale measures cannot be used (Directive 
                                                 
1 See for example a study prepared by Teligen Ltd for the European Commission on entry issues in EU 
telecommunications markets (http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/marketentry.html). 
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2002/22/EC, Article 17). Further, we assume that the regulator is unable to make a credible 
commitment to a particular access pricing regime prior to the incumbent’s investment 
decision, as the investment that we consider is irreversible and has an effect over a long 
period of time. We share the view expressed by Pindyck (2004, 5), who argues that most 
network investments in telecommunications are irreversible, either because the cost of 
investment simply cannot be recovered through resale (as in the case of fibre-optic cable laid 
underground) or because the investment is industry-specific. In the latter case, cost recovery 
through resale is impossible because the value of the investment is likely to be similar for all 
firms in the industry.  
 
We model the rival firms in the retail sector as a competitive fringe. The assumption of price 
taking rivals in the retail market seems justifiable, as we assume that fixed costs in the retail 
market are negligible. The competitive fringe model has been used extensively also in the 
literature on optimal access pricing in a static context (see for example Armstrong (2002, 
Section 2)). Further, we assume that there is vertical differentiation between the incumbent 
and the fringe. Vertical differentiation can arise in our model for example due to switching 
costs that customers incur when they choose to subscribe to one of the fringe firms instead of 
the incumbent. This assumption together with the assumption that rivals are small makes the 
model suitable for analysing the effect of the incumbent’s investment decision on entry. 
 
The main issues of interest that arise in our paper are two-fold. Firstly, we examine the effect 
of spillovers to rivals’ demand on the incumbent’s incentives for investment. Secondly, we 
draw conclusions on cases in which the incumbent takes actions to foreclose the rivals from 
the market. In particular, we are interested in the interaction between these two issues: on the 
one hand, the presence of rivals has an effect on investment incentives, and on the other hand, 
the incumbent’s investment decision has consequences for the viability of competition. The 
issues discussed in this paper are highly relevant to today’s regulators, who are concerned 
about both encouraging investment for example in broadband telecommunications networks 
and ensuring competition in the provision of services over these networks2. 
 
We find that spillovers have a negative effect on investment incentives when access prices are 
regulated: as the incumbent is not allowed to make a profit on access provision, investment 
                                                 
2 See for example an outline of the EU Commission’s policies on promoting broadband access at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/broadband/index_en.htm 
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incentives are lower than in the absence of regulation. Further, if rivals benefit more from the 
investment than does the incumbent, the disincentive effect is so strong that no investment 
will take place. We also find that the underinvestment problem may have negative effects on 
the viability of competition: when also rivals benefit from the investment, a low investment 
level can force the rivals to exit the market. If investments were increased towards the socially 
optimal level, this would not only be beneficial in itself, but would also facilitate competition. 
Further, we find that in the presence of access price regulation, rivals are most likely to be 
foreclosed precisely when they would bring highest benefits to consumers. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The related literature is briefly discussed in 
Section 2. The model is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the case with no 
price regulation. In Section 5, the effects of access price regulation are considered. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
The paper closest to ours is Foros (2004), who examines an access provider’s incentives to 
upgrade its network to broadband when it also acts as an internet service provider and faces a 
single competitor in the retail market. Our paper differs from that of Foros in that we assume 
that operators set prices, whereas Foros assumes Cournot competition between the ISPs in the 
retail market. Our paper is in this respect more closely related to the existing literature on 
access pricing and telecommunications competition, where the assumption of price 
competition has typically been made. Further, our specification differs from that of Foros due 
to our assumption of vertical differentiation between the operators. As in Foros, the 
investment examined in our paper can be interpreted for example as upgrading an existing 
(narrowband) telecommunications network to broadband. However, the framework is rather 
general and the investment can be thought of as any activity by the incumbent that increases 
customers’ willingness to pay for telecommunications services.   
 
Foros (2004) emphasises that in the presence of access price regulation, the incumbent can 
use overinvestment (relative to the monopoly level) to deter entry when the incumbent’s 
ability to offer value added services is much higher than that of the rival. However, we 
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demonstrate that the incumbent underinvests (relative to the socially optimal level) and when 
the rivals are relatively efficient in turning the investment into value added services,  
suboptimal investments can lead to foreclosure. As foreclosure due to underinvestment occurs 
precisely when entry would bring the highest benefits to consumers, this underinvestment 
problem is all the more detrimental to social welfare.  
 
Other previous studies on the effects of access price regulation on investment incentives 
include Gans (2001), who considers a situation where different firms compete to become the 
access provider for new types of network services. He shows that in the presence of such a 
race, a socially optimal level of investment can be reached. Our focus is, however, on the 
incumbent’s incentives to upgrade its existing network, which is assumed to have natural 
monopoly characteristics. Pindyck (2004), Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000) and Hausman and 
Sidak (1999) analyse the effects of the access pricing rule currently used in the US, namely 
total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) pricing, on the investment incentives of 
both incumbents and entrants. Sidak and Spulber (1997) emphasise the significance of the 
regulator’s commitment problem in a dynamic setting. Buehler et al (2004) examine the 
effects of several different institutional settings on a network owner's investment incentives, 
but they do not consider the case of an integrated network owner competing with independent 
downstream rivals. Cambini and Valletti (2003) study competing network operators’ 
incentives to invest in facilities with different levels of quality 
 
Numerous authors have considered the question of how investment spillovers affect private 
incentives to perform R&D. These studies date back to Arrow (1962) and the issue has later 
been examined among others by Spence (1984), D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and 
Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992).3 Investment incentives in an oligopoly with vertical product 
differentiation have been examined by Motta (1992) and Rosenkranz (1995). The case studied 
here is different from those models due to the vertical relationship between the incumbent and 
its rivals, that is, the fact that the incumbent acts as a supplier of an intermediate good to its 
rivals: even if the incumbent’s and the rival firms’ final services are substitutes, higher 
demand for the rivals’ services will not necessarily be detrimental to the incumbent, as it will 
also cause an increase in the rivals’ demand for access. The precise effect of access provision 
on investment incentives depends, of course, crucially on the access pricing regime. 
                                                 
3 See also Amir (2000) for a comparison between the different models and De Bondt (1996) for a survey and 
further references. 
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 We also examine the conditions under which the incumbent chooses an access price or an 
investment level that causes the rivals to exit the market and our paper is therefore related to 
the literature on foreclosure. A recent contribution in this field is Rey and Tirole (2003), 
which considers a bottleneck owner’s incentives for foreclosure in the absence of regulation. 
Other articles particularly relevant from the point of view of our paper include Weisman 
(1995, 1998, 2001), Reiffen (1998) and Beard et al (2001), which examine incentives to 
reduce the quality of the input sold to downstream rivals when there is price competition 
downstream. A major difference between our model and these analyses is that in those papers, 
discrimination takes the form of activities that raise rivals’ marginal costs. The bottleneck 
owner then has two possible instruments of discrimination, excessive access pricing and input 
quality degradation, that both affect the rival in the same way (increase marginal cost) but the 
former has a direct positive effect on the incumbent’s profit while the latter may be costly for 
the incumbent (as for example in Weisman (1995)). Therefore it is not surprising that the 
incentives for quality degradation are shown to be especially strong under stringent access 
price regulation (see for example Beard et al (2001)). Reiffen et al (2000) also find some 
empirical evidence of discrimination against independent rival operators by regulated, 
vertically integrated LECs in the US cellular industry. In our model, investment affects the 
incumbent as well as the rivals, and therefore cannot be used as an instrument of 
discrimination that could be targeted at the rivals only. 
  
 
3. The Model 
 
We model the rival firms in the retail sector as a competitive fringe, that is, the rivals are a 
group of small firms supplying an identical product. Even though the fringe behaves 
competitively, the incumbent is assumed to retain some level of market power and profits. We 
assume that this market power arises due to vertical differentiation between the final services 
provided by the incumbent and the fringe. We further assume that there are negligible fixed 
costs in the retail market and hence the assumption of price taking rivals in the retail market 
seems justifiable. Using a competitive fringe model allows us to concentrate on the effect of 
access prices on the incumbent’s investment decisions: we can abstract for example from 
strategic interaction between the incumbent and the rivals in the retail market, as the rivals’ 
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retail price will always equal their marginal cost, plus the access charge. We also adopt the 
simplifying assumption of complete information and no uncertainty. The regulator is assumed 
to have full information about the incumbent’s technology and costs and there is no 
uncertainty about the returns on investment4.  
 
In the telecommunications market, consumers typically choose one operator and buy all their 
services from that single operator and consumers therefore face a discrete choice of which 
operator to subscribe to. Unlike most previous studies of competition in telecommunications 
markets, we allow for the possibility of partial participation in the market, so that some 
consumers can choose not to subscribe to any of the firms. We assume that customers have 
unit demands, so that a customer who subscribes to firm i ( 2,1=i ) pays a price  for a 
single unit of telecommunications services.5 We use the index 1 to refer to the incumbent and 
2 to the fringe. 
ip
 
We assume that consumers differ in their basic willingness to pay for telecommunications 
services. We denote a consumer’s basic valuation for the incumbent’s service by x  and 
assume that x  is uniformly distributed on ( )1,0  with density 1. Further, the services of the 
incumbent are assumed to be vertically differentiated from those of the fringe so that a 
customer’s basic valuation for the fringe’s services is given by xγ  with ( 1,0∈ )γ . This 
formulation can be justified for example by assuming that all customers have previously been 
served by the incumbent: the services of the fringe firms are assumed to only become 
available in the present period and a customer who chooses to use the services of one of the 
fringe firms instead of those of the incumbent will incur a switching cost equal to ( )xγ−1 .6 
This assumption together with the assumption that rivals are small makes the model suitable 
also for analysing the effect of investment on entry. Switching costs can arise for example as 
a result of the lack of number portability, customer loyalty or the costs of searching for 
information on prices and quality of different operators.   
 
                                                 
4 See for example Pindyck (2004) and Hausman and Sidak (1999, 458-460) for a discussion of some effects of 
uncertainty on investment incentives under access price regulation. 
5 If the firms incur a constant marginal cost per customer (independently of call minutes), our assumption of unit 
demands is equivalent to assuming  that the deals offered by the firms consist of an unlimited number of call 
minutes for a fixed charge. Such deals are commonly observed in the market for internet access.  
6 Note that it is necessary to have switching costs differ continuously across individuals in order to avoid 
discontinuities in the demand functions. Here, the switching cost is proportional to the consumers’ basic 
valuation x. 
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We investigate the incumbent’s incentives to invest in a technology that increases consumers’ 
willingness to pay for telecommunications services. We assume that the incumbent’s 
investment activity takes the following form7: an investment that causes all consumers’ 
valuation for the incumbent’s services to increase by an amount m costs the incumbent 2
2
1 mψ . 
This specification implies the simplifying assumption that the effect of the investment is the 
same for all consumers, independently of x . However, we have also examined the 
implications of an alternative specification, where the effect of the investment enters 
multiplicatively with x , so that consumers with a higher ex ante valuation for 
telecommunications services also value the investment more highly. This change in the 
assumptions did not affect the main qualitative results of our model under access price 
regulation8. 
 
As the incumbent and its rivals use the same network, any demand enhancing investment by 
the incumbent in its infrastructure is likely to have a positive effect also on the demand for the 
rivals’ service. We denote the fraction of the benefits of the investment that spill over to the 
rivals by β , so that consumers’ valuation for the services provided by the fringe increases by 
mβ . We therefore assume that the effects of the investment on the consumers’ valuation for 
the incumbent’s and the rivals’ products can differ in magnitude. The spillovers can be 
incomplete, in which case 1<β . However, we also allow for the possibility that the 
investment is more beneficial for the firms in the fringe than for the incumbent, so that 1>β . 
This latter case can occur for example if the rivals’ ability to use the new technology to 
provide new, value added services is greater than the incumbent’s9. Indeed, our preferred 
interpretation of the spillover parameter β  is that it measures the rivals’ relative efficiency or 
ability to convert the infrastructure investment into new services valued by consumers. This 
seems to be the most appropriate interpretation in our model, as the incumbent and the fringe 
use the same physical network, yet consumers’ willingness to pay for the final services 
provided over the network can differ between the two.  
 
                                                 
7 We model the innovation technology and spillovers as in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) (with the 
difference that their paper considers a cost reducing investment). Amir (2000) has pointed out some drawbacks 
in the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin model that occur when the number of innovating firms is large.   
8 See the end of Section 5.3 and Appendix G for details. 
9 A similar idea is incorporated into Foros’s (2004) model.  
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A consumer with basic valuation x  chooses to buy from the incumbent rather than the fringe 
if 21 pmxpmx −+>−+ βγ , that is, if ( ) ( )mppx 11 21 −+−>− βγ . The consumer therefore 
compares the cost of switching to a rival with the price difference between the firms and the 
relative benefits from the investment. The person with the highest valuation buys from the 
incumbent if 1 2pm1pm +>−+ −βγ . This condition is needed for it to be possible for both 
firms to be active in the market, and we assume for now that this condition holds. The market 
is then segmented in such a way that the incumbent serves those customers with the highest 
valuation for telecommunications services and the fringe those with an intermediate valuation, 
and customers with a very low valuation might not purchase at all10. There are then two 
marginal consumers, a consumer (with valuation ) who is indifferent between buying from 
the incumbent and the fringe, and another (with valuation )  who is indifferent between 
buying from the fringe and not buying at all. The valuations of these marginal consumers are 
given by 
Ax
Bx
( )[ ]m−βppxA 1
1
21 +−−= γ 1  and [ ]mpxB βγ −= 2
1 .11 Given our uniform distribution 
assumption, the demand functions for the firms’ final products are linear and they are given 
by  and A BA xxq −x−q = 11 =2 , that is, 
 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) 

 −+−−=
+−−−+=
21212
21211
1
1
1,,
1
1
11,,
ppmmppq
ppmmppq
γγ
γβ
γ
βγ . (1) 
 
The corresponding inverse demands are given by 
 
 
( )
( ) ( 21212
21211
,,
1,,
qqmmqqp
qqmmqqp
+−+=
−−+=
γβγ )
γ
.   (2) 
 
We assume that there is a fixed cost  of network operation but the fixed costs in the retail 
market are negligible. The incumbent incurs a marginal cost c per customer of originating and 
terminating calls on its network. Further, we assume that the incumbent and the fringe have 
f
                                                 
10 Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that such an equilibrium (where consumers with highest willingness to pay 
buy from the highest quality firm and so on) typically arises in models with vertical differentiation. 
11 Note that in order to avoid having to consider corner solutions, we need to make sure that  in 
equilibrium (see footnotes 13 and 20 below).   
0>Bx
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equal marginal costs in the retail sector, and we normalise these costs to zero for simplicity. 
Because of zero marginal costs in the retail segment, the marginal cost of the fringe’s final 
service is simply equal to the access charge , while the marginal cost of the incumbent is . 
We make the assumption that 
a c
γ<c  so that the marginal cost of network provision is such 
that both of the final products could be profitably supplied by a monopolist.  
p
c−pm +− 1
 
In equilibrium, the firms in the fringe set a=2  and make zero profit. The incumbent’s 
profits are therefore given by 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) fmcaapmpamap −−−

 −+−−+

 −−+=
2
111 2
11
1
11
1
11,, ψγγ
γβ
γβγπ , (3) 
 
where the first term is the profit from retail sales to the incumbent’s own customers and the 
second term is the profit from selling access to the fringe.  
 
4. Unregulated access charge 
 
We first assume that the incumbent can set both its retail price and the access charge freely. 
The timing of the model is as follows. First, the incumbent chooses the level of investment 
and incurs the associated costs as explained above. Second, the incumbent sets the prices for 
its retail product and for access. The model is solved by backwards induction, that is, we start 
solving the model from the last stage. 
 
 
4.1  Incumbent’s pricing decisions 
 
In the last stage of the model, the incumbent chooses its own retail price and the access charge 
so as to maximise (3), taking the level of investment as given. The profit maximising levels of 
 and  as functions of the investment level are given by 1p a
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )cmma
cmmp
++=
++=
βγ
2
1
1
2
1
*
*
1
    (4) 
 
Equations (4) show that in the present model, the incumbent sets the access charge and its 
own final price as if it was a monopolist supplying both its own retail product and the retail 
product of the rivals and facing the inverse demand functions in equations (2). In the 
competitive fringe model, the rivals firms cannot behave strategically and they therefore 
resemble a subsidiary to the incumbent.  
 
Inserting (4) into (1) yields the equilibrium quantities for the firms as functions of the level of 
investment. These quantities are given by 
 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )γγ
γβγ
γ
βγ
−
−+−=
−
−+−=
12
1
12
11
*
2
*
1
mcmq
mmq
 .    (5) 
 
It can be seen from (5) that if there is no investment, the rivals will not be active in the 
market. Further, even if the investment level is positive, βγ <  is a necessary condition for 
the rival firms to be active in the market; the rivals’ output is then increasing in investment. If 
the reverse holds, the incumbent’s pricing decisions alone imply that the rivals will be 
foreclosed from the market12. From now on, we will therefore assume that the condition 
βγ <  holds and we can then consider the effect of the incumbent’s investment decision on 
market outcomes. The necessary and sufficient conditions for when the rivals are active in the 
market are explored fully below.  
 
It should also be noted that if the spillover parameter β  is sufficiently greater than 1, it may 
be possible that the quality ordering of the final products of the incumbent and the fringe is 
reversed as a result of investment. This happens if the parameter values of the model are such 
that 1 ( ) 01 >−+− mβγ . In this case, the incumbent itself will leave the retail market and will 
                                                 
12 In that case the incumbent chooses the investment level that is optimal when it is a monopolist also in the retail 
market.  
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act only as a network provider. We will not examine this possibility in more detail in the 
current paper. 
 
 
4.2  Optimal investment level and effect of spillovers 
 
The incumbent’s optimal level of investment can be calculated after substituting (4) into (3). 
The privately optimal level of investment is given by 
  
 
( )( )
( )γγψγββγ
βγγ
−+−−
−−=
122
1
2
* cm    (6) 
 
For the second order condition to be satisfied, we need to require that 
 
 .     (7) ( ) 0122 2 >−+−− γγψγββγ
 
This is satisfied for example if the parameter ψ  is large enough, that is, if the investment cost 
function is convex enough. If ψ  were small and the above second order condition did not 
hold, it would be optimal for the incumbent to increase investment indefinitely. Therefore 
equation (7) is also the condition that is required for the existence of equilibrium13. It can be 
noted from (6) that the optimal investment level is positive as long as ( ) 0>− cβγ , that is, 
c>β
γ . The marginal cost of producing the extra demand should therefore not be too high for 
investment to occur. In the following discussion we assume that this condition holds. 
 
 
The comparative statics of the equilibrium investment level with respect to the level of 
spillovers are given by 
 
                                                 
13 A sufficient (though not a necessary) condition to guarantee that  in equilibrium is 0>Bx( )( ) ( ) 01122 2 >−−−+−− γβγγψγββγ . That is, to avoid having to consider corner solutions, we would need 
to impose a slightly stronger condition regarding the convexity of the investment cost function than condition 
(7). This does not affect the results of the paper.  
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( ) ( )[ ] ( ){ }
( )[ ] 0122 2121 22
2*
>−+−−
−+−−−−=∂
∂
γγψγββγ
γβγγγψβγγ
β
cm
.  (8) 
 
It is shown in Appendix A that the expression in (8) is positive for the permissible range of 
parameter values. Hence we can say that in the absence of price regulation, spillovers have a 
positive effect on investment incentives. The fact that also rivals benefit from the investment 
is therefore not in itself detrimental to investment incentives. This finding is not surprising 
given that in the present model, the incumbent can earn monopoly profits also from the access 
market. A similar result is obtained by Foros (2004).  
We can also compare the privately optimal investment level m  with the investment level 
that would be socially optimal under the same circumstances (that is, assuming that the rest of 
the game is unaltered)14. We take social welfare to be the sum of consumer surplus and the 
incumbent’s profits (the profits of the fringe firms are zero). Given the inverse demand curves 
in (2), consumer surplus is given by 
*
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
22
1,, 2111
qamqpmmapCS −++−+= βγ   (9) 
 
and total welfare is then given by  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )mapmapCSmapW ,,,,,, 111 π+= .    (10) 
 
In the present case total welfare is ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )mmampmmampCSmmamp ,,,,,, **1**1**1 π+=W  
and the total derivative of  welfare with respect to investment is given by  
mdm
da
adm
dP
Pm
CS
dm
da
a
CS
dm
dP
P
CS
dm
dW
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂ πππ *
*
*
*+∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂=
*
*
*
*
. The fourth and the fifth terms 
in this expression are zero by the envelope theorem. Setting this expression equal to zero and 
solving for the socially optimal investment level yields15 
 
 ( )( )( ) ( )γγψγββγ βγγ −+−− −−= 1423 13 2 cmSO      (11) 
                                                 
14 In general, a monopolist can have either too high or too low incentives to invest in quality (Spence 1975). 
15 The second order condition for the regulator’s problem is ( ) ( )γγψγββγ −+−− 1423 2  > 0 and we assume 
that it is satisfied. 
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 It is shown in Appendix B that  and we can therefore conclude that the incumbent 
underinvests compared to the social optimum. Our results regarding the incumbent’s 
investment decision are summarised in the following proposition: 
*mmSO >
 
Proposition 1. When there is no access price regulation, spillovers have a positive effect on 
investment. Nevertheless, investment is below the socially optimal level. 
 
 
4.3 Foreclosure due to underinvestment 
 
It was shown above that the incumbent’s optimal level of investment will be below the social 
optimum. We will now examine the consequences of the incumbent’s investment decision on 
the firms’ outputs in equilibrium. Inserting (6) into (5) yields equations for the incumbent’s 
and the fringe’s equilibrium quantities as functions of the model parameters only. These 
quantities are given by 
 
 
( )[ ] ( )
( )[ ]
( ) ( )
( )γγψγββγ
γψβγβ
γγψγββγ
γγψββγβ
−+−−
−−−+−=
−+−−
−+−+−=
122
121
1222
121
2
*
2
2
*
1
ccq
cq
.   (12) 
 
The rivals’ output is positive if and only if ( ) ( ) 0121 >−−−+− γψβγβ cc . This condition 
can be written as ( )[ 121 ] 0>−−−+− cγψβγβ . This entails that in order for the rivals to be 
active in the market, the model parameters have to satisfy the condition16  
 
 ( )γψβ
γβ
−+−
−≡<
121
fcc .     (13) 
 
This can be interpreted as a condition concerning the marginal cost of production ( ) or the 
degree of convexity of the cost of investment (measured by the parameter (
c
ψ )). Either of 
these should be sufficiently low for the rivals to be active in the market.  Note also that the 
                                                 
16 See Appendix C for a proof that ( ) 0121 >−+− γψβ . 
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right hand side of (13) is lower than 
β
γ  or γ  and therefore (13) is stricter than our previous 
conditions concerning c. We can now state the following proposition:  
 
 
Proposition 2. When there is no access price regulation, condition (13) is necessary and 
sufficient for the rivals to be active in the market.  
 
The condition βγ <  implies that the rivals’ output is increasing in the level of investment. 
Therefore a low level of output by the rivals (or foreclosure) is a symptom of a low 
investment level. If the marginal cost of producing the extra demand is too high or if the cost 
of investment increases too rapidly, it is not profitable for the incumbent to engage in a high 
level of investment and foreclosure becomes more likely. Further, as was shown above, the 
incumbent chooses an investment level that is below the social optimum and we can therefore 
say that in the present model, foreclosure can be caused by underinvestment. If this 
underinvestment problem could be solved, this would not only be beneficial in itself, but it 
would also facilitate competition. 
 
Further, as the right hand side of (13) is increasing in β , we can make the following 
statement:   
 
Corollary 1. When there is no access price regulation, foreclosure is most likely to occur 
when investment spillovers are low. 
 
A low value of the spillover parameter β  implies that the incumbent’s investment has only a 
small positive impact on customers’ willingness to pay for the rivals’ product. As the 
incumbent can, in the absence of regulation, make a monopoly profit also on access provision, 
low investment spillovers discourage investment and therefore make the exit of rivals more 
likely.  
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 5. Regulated access charge 
  
Let us next consider the outcome of the model when the access charge is optimally regulated, 
and compare the results to those obtained under no regulation. We assume that due to the 
irreversibility of the network investment, the regulator cannot commit to an access pricing 
rule prior to the investment stage17. The timing of the model is then as follows. First, the 
incumbent chooses the level of investment. Second, the regulator sets the access charge. 
Third, the incumbent sets its retail price and outputs and profits are realised. The timing of the 
model is summarised in Figure 1. The model is again solved by backwards induction. 
 
 
Investment          Access price regulation Retail competition 
 
Figure 1. Timing of the model. 
 
 
5.1 Incumbent’s pricing decision and access price regulation 
 
In the last stage, the incumbent sets its retail price, taking the access charge and the level of 
investment as given. The incumbent’s problem is therefore to maximise (3) with respect to 
. The optimal price as a function of the access charge and the level of investment is given 
by 
1p
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]ammap 211
2
1,*1 +−+−= βγ .   (14)
      
                                                 
17 Foros (2004) makes the same assumption about timing as we do in the present paper. Cambini and Valletti 
(2003) argue for and use the alternative assumption that the regulator sets the access price prior to the investment 
stage.  
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In the second stage, the regulator chooses the access charge so as to maximise total welfare, 
which is now given by18 ( ) ( ) ( )apapCSapW ,,, *1*1*1 π+= , where the consumer surplus 
function is as in (9). The total derivative of total welfare with respect to the access charge is 
ada
dP
P ∂
∂+ ππ
*
*a
CS
da
dP
P
CS
da
dW
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂=
*
*  and the third term of this expression is again zero 
by the envelope theorem. Setting this expression equal to zero and solving for the access 
charge yields the result that the socially optimal (regulated) access charge is in the present 
model equal to the marginal cost of network provision19, that is, caR = .  
 
The result a  is not surprising: as the incumbent’s final price is not regulated, the 
problem of financing the incumbent’s fixed costs is not an issue for the regulator. From this 
point of view, if there are no other distortions present, optimal regulation indeed implies 
marginal cost pricing. However, our model involves distortions caused by incumbent market 
power. When one considers access price regulation in the presence of incumbent market 
power, there are usually two opposing considerations that call for an access charge different 
from marginal cost: on the one hand, an access charge below marginal cost would reduce the 
incumbent’s final price and therefore reduce the deadweight loss caused by market power. On 
the other hand, the need to rebalance consumers’ choice between the incumbent’s and the 
fringe’s final products would call for an access charge above marginal cost. In general, the 
overall effect of these two factors is ambiguous, and the optimal access charge can be either 
above or below marginal cost. However, Laffont and Tirole (1994) have shown that these 
effects cancel out when both the incumbent and the rival’s demand functions are linear, as we 
have assumed in the present model. 
cR =
 
In the present model, optimal access pricing is independent of the investment decision taken 
by the incumbent firm. This feature is due to the assumption that the regulator cannot commit 
to an access pricing policy before investment has taken place. After the investment decision 
has been taken, the regulator’s problem is essentially a static one. 
 
                                                 
18 In order to make the expression less cumbersome, we drop the arguments in the functions   
, 
( )maa =
( )( )mmapp ,*1*1 = ( )( ) ( )( )mamapqq ,*1*1*1 = ,  and ( )( ) ( )( )mamapqq ,*1*2*2 = . 
19 We use the subscript R throughout to refer to outcomes in the presence of access price regulation.  
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The incumbent’s and the rivals’ equilibrium quantities in the model with access price 
regulation are given by 
 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )γγ
βγγβγγ
γ
βγ
−
−−+−−=
−
−+−=
12
221
12
11
*
,2
*
,1
mcmq
mmq
R
R
.  (15) 
 
It can be noted from (15) that the incumbent’s output (as a function of the level of investment) 
is the same as in the unregulated case. Access price regulation has lowered the price of the 
competitors’ product, which by (14) causes a fall also in the incumbent’s price. The effect of 
these price changes on the incumbent’s demand exactly offset each other in our linear model.  
 
In order to make this case comparable with the case of no regulation analysed above, we 
continue to assume that γβ > . With this assumption, the rivals’ output is again increasing in 
m and 
2
γ<c  would be a sufficient condition for the rivals to be active in the market regardless 
of the level of investment. In order to find a necessary condition, we need to examine the 
incumbent’s investment decision under access price regulation. 
 
 
5.2  Optimal investment level and effect of spillovers 
 
In the first stage of the model with regulation, the incumbent chooses the level of investment, 
anticipating the regulator’s decision on the access charge that will follow and its own pricing 
decision in the last stage. The incumbent’s objective function in the present case is obtained 
from (3) by setting a cR = and inserting the optimal price from (14). The incumbent’s optimal 
investment level is now given by 
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )2* 112
11
βγψ
βγ
−−−
−−=Rm .    (16) 
 
The second order condition takes the form  
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     (17)  ( ) ( ) 0112 2 >−−− βγψ
 
and it is satisfied, given (7)20. We can observe from (16) that with optimal access price 
regulation, the level of investment is positive if and only if 1<β . In the presence of access 
price regulation, the comparative statics of the investment level with respect to the level of 
spillovers are given by 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] 0112 1121 22
2*
<
−−−
−+−−=∂
∂
βγψ
βγψγ
β
Rm ,   (18) 
 
which is always negative. These results have an intuitive interpretation: as the incumbent is 
not allowed to make a profit on access provision, the fact that part of the benefits of the 
incumbent’s investment efforts accrue on rivals has a negative effect on investment 
incentives. Further, if investment would benefit the fringe more than the incumbent ( 1>β ), 
investment is not profitable for the incumbent and therefore no investment will take place: in 
this case, both the incumbent’s equilibrium price in (14) and its equilibrium quantity in (15) 
are decreasing in the level of investment. In Appendix D we show that access price regulation 
also lowers investment incentives relative to the unregulated case, so that .   ** Rmm >
 
Foros (2004) obtains similar results, except that in his model investments are driven down to 
zero only when the competitor is twice as efficient as the incumbent in converting the 
investment into value added services ( 2>β ). Therefore the disincentive effects of 
investment spillovers under access price regulation are stronger in the present model than in 
Foros’s model.  
 
Again, we can compare the investment level chosen by the incumbent in the presence of 
access price regulation, with the investment level that would be socially optimal under the 
same circumstances. The socially optimal investment level would be such that total welfare 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )maampmaampCSmaampW RRRRRR ,,,,,,,,, *1*1*1 π+=  is maximised. Again, 
                                                 
20 In the case of access price regulation, a necessary condition to guarantee that  is 0>Bx
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )211211 βγψγββ −−−−−=> cc . That is, to avoid having to consider corner solutions, we would need 
to impose a minimum level of c. This does not affect the results of the paper (see also footnote 24).   
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taking the total derivative of total welfare with respect to the investment level and setting this 
expression to zero yields21 
 
  ( ) ( )γγψγγββγβ
βγβγγ
−+−+−
−+−
14364
)43)(1( cSO
R =m   (19) 
 
It is shown in the Appendix E that , so that the socially optimal investment level 
would again be higher than the investment level chosen by the incumbent.  
*
R
SO
R mm >
 
The results regarding the incumbent’s choice of investment level and the effect of spillovers 
in the case of access price regulation are summarised in the following proposition:  
 
 
Proposition 3. When the access charge is optimally regulated, spillovers have a negative 
effect on investment. The level of investment is below the socially optimal level and it is also 
lower than in the absence of access price regulation. If competitors would benefit more from 
the investment than the incumbent ( 1>β ), there is no investment. 
 
Comparing the cases with and without access price regulation, we can say that the presence of 
competitors who also benefit from the incumbent’s investment efforts is not detrimental to 
investment incentives per se, but incentives are perversely affected by access provision only 
when the access charge is regulated.  
 
 
5.3 Foreclosure due to underinvestment 
 
When the access price is regulated, the incumbent might want to use other instruments, 
namely its choice of the investment level, to deter entry22. However, as we continue to assume 
that γβ > , the fringe’s output in (15) is increasing in the level of investment, and therefore 
                                                 
21 We again assume that the second order condition ( ) ( ) 014364 >−+−+− γγψγγββγβ  holds. 
22 When the access price is not regulated, the incumbent will not have an incentive to distort its investment 
decision to deter entry, as raising the access price is a costless way of achieving the same result whenever it is 
optimal. This is related to the finding for example in Beard et al (2001) that the incentives for non-price 
discrimination increase when access price regulation becomes more stringent. 
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using overinvestment to deter entry will not be possible23. On the other hand, entry deterrence 
by underinvestment is not a credible strategy: as noted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the 
possibility of such strategic underinvestment arises only if the incumbent is not able to invest 
after entry.  
 
However, as the incumbent’s optimal level of investment in the presence of competition is 
again below the socially optimal level, the model does exhibit an underinvestment problem. 
This can have similar consequences as those analysed in Section 4.3. Taking into account the 
level of investment given in (16), the equilibrium quantities of the incumbent and the fringe 
are given by 
 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( )(
( ) ( )[ ] )2*,2
2
*
,1
112
2111
112
1
βγψγ
γγψββγβ
βγψ
γψ
−−−
−−+−+−−=
−−−
−=
ccq
q
R
R
  (20) 
 
The incumbent’s output is always positive. The rivals’ output will be positive if and only if  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) 02111 >−−+−+−− cc γγψββγβ . This condition can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) 0>γ11121 2 −+−−+−−− γψβγβγψβ c . We know by the second order condition 
(17) that the coefficient of c  in this expression is negative. Therefore, when 1<β  and the 
incumbent sets the level of investment given by (16), the necessary and sufficient condition 
for the rivals to be active in the market is  
 
 ( )( ) (( ) ( )
)
2112
11
βγψ
γγψγββ
−−−
−+−−≡< fRcc .   (21) 
   
                                                 
23 Note that the rivals’ output is increasing in investment if γ
γβ −> 2 , which is less strict than the condition  
γβ >  that we have assumed.  
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It is shown in Appendix F that  and therefore there is nothing in the model that would 
guarantee that (21) holds24. Therefore, access price regulation does not necessarily guarantee 
the viability of competition.  
γ<fRc
 
It should be stressed that condition (21) refers to the case where 1<β . If spillovers were such 
that investment would benefit the rivals more than the incumbent ( 1>β ), we know that the 
incumbent would undertake no investment and (21) would not be a sufficient condition for the 
rivals to be active in the market: in that case we would need the stricter condition 
2
γ<c  to 
hold. The main results of this Section are summarised in the following proposition: 
 
 
Proposition 4: When the access price is optimally regulated and 1<β , condition (21) is 
necessary and sufficient for the rivals to be active in the market. If 1>β , 
2
γ<c  is necessary 
and sufficient for the rivals to be active in the market. 
 
Corollary 2. When there is access price regulation, foreclosure is most likely to occur when 
investment spillovers are high. 
 
It should be noted that the incumbent’s profit function is discontinuous at the point , 
since at this point some of the customers who have bought from the rivals will switch to 
buying from the incumbent. Therefore the incumbent might have an incentive to use 
underinvestment to foreclose the rivals from the market even for cost levels lower than those 
indicated by condition (21). However, as was noted above, such a strategy of entry deterrence 
would not be credible: if the rivals were to enter, the incumbent would raise investments to 
the level that is optimal in the presence of competition, that is, to the level given in (18). This 
level of investment leads to foreclosure, if condition (21) is violated. Hence, violation of 
condition (21) indicates the situations where foreclosure is both optimal and feasible for the 
incumbent.  
0*2 =q
 
                                                 
24 Further, it can be shown that fRcc <  (see footnote 20), so that there are parameter values for which the rivals 
are active in the market ( fRcc <<c ) and parameter values for which they are foreclosed by insufficient 
investments (c >c ). fR
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Comparing the cases with and without access price regulation, it can be noted that in the case 
without regulation, the incumbent’s and the regulator’s interests are partially aligned in the 
following sense: without regulation, foreclosure is most likely to occur when the rivals are 
relatively inefficient in utilising the investment, that is, when spillovers are low. However, in 
the case with access price regulation, the opposite holds: foreclosure due to underinvestment 
is most likely to occur if the rivals are relatively efficient in turning the investment into 
services valued by consumers. Socially suboptimal investments now have three negative 
effects: the underinvestment problem is detrimental not only in itself, but it also causes 
problems for the viability of competition. Further, competition is most likely to be eliminated 
precisely when it would bring the highest benefits for consumers.  
 
Throughout the analysis, we have made the simplifying assumption that the effect of the 
investment is the same for all consumers, independently of the consumer’s type (x). However, 
it should be noted that the main qualitative results of this and the previous Section are robust 
to a change in the model specification, where we allow the effect of the investment to vary 
according to the consumer’s type (that is, consumers with a high initial valuation for 
telecommunications services also value the investment more highly than consumers with a 
low initial valuation). We analyse this case in Appendix G. Also in this case access is 
regulated at marginal cost, investments are decreasing in the level of spillovers, investments 
go to zero if 1>β , and for high levels of β , investments are so low that rivals are forced to 
exit the market.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have analysed a vertically integrated monopolist telecommunications network provider’s 
incentives to invest in a technology that increases demand, when it also provides network 
access to rivals in the retail market. We have found that even though rivals benefit from the 
investment, this is not in itself detrimental for investment incentives: when the incumbent is 
free to choose the access charge, the level of investment is increasing in the degree of 
spillovers to rivals’ demand. However, access price regulation has a negative effect on 
investment incentives: the level of investment is in our model always lower with access price 
regulation than without it. Further, when the access price is optimally regulated, spillovers 
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that benefit rivals have an unambiguously negative effect on investment incentives. If the 
rivals are more efficient in utilising the investment than is the incumbent, this disincentive 
effect is so strong that no investment will take place.  
 
We have also shown that the incumbent’s optimal investment level is below the social 
optimum, regardless of whether access charges are regulated or not. We have emphasised 
three reasons for why this underinvestment problem deserves attention from regulators. 
Firstly, like any other market distortion, insufficient investments imply losses to social 
welfare. Secondly, when spillovers are high and the rivals would therefore benefit 
considerably from the investment, the underinvestment problem will also have adverse effects 
on the viability of competition. In some cases the investment level can be so low that the 
rivals are foreclosed from the market completely. Thirdly, in the case of access price 
regulation, the underinvestment problem is most likely to lead to the exclusion of competitors 
precisely when they would bring the highest benefits for consumers.  
 
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the regulator cannot commit to an access pricing 
regime prior to the incumbent’s investment decision. This assumption is realistic in the 
present context, as investments in telecommunications infrastructure are typically irreversible. 
If the regulator were able to credibly commit to an access pricing regime prior to the 
investment stage, it would take into account the effect of access price regulation on 
investment incentives. The access charge would then be set at some level  and the 
effect on investment incentives would be weaker than in the case analysed here. We expect 
that the access pricing rule that would minimise the negative effect on investment incentives 
would be an ECPR-type rule, where the incumbent would be compensated for lost profit in 
the retail market due to entry. However, as long as the regulator has only one instrument at its 
disposal, the optimal outcome would in any case involve settling a trade-off between 
providing investment incentives and ensuring static allocative efficiency. Therefore, even if 
the commitment problem could be solved, the lessons of the present paper would likely not 
lose their relevance entirely: some mitigating effect on investment incentives is likely to be 
observed as long as selling access is less profitable than selling telecommunications services 
directly to final customers.  
ca R >
 
Some authors have argued that the losses that arise from the negative investment effects of 
access price regulation are so large that “new” services should be exempt from access price 
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regulation altogether (see for example Hausman and Sidak 1999, 458). Another alternative 
would be to use another instrument in addition to access pricing, namely an investment 
subsidy. A combination of two instruments would enable the regulator to achieve its two 
goals of promoting competition and providing optimal incentives for investment.  
 
However, the success of either of these policy measures – no regulation of new services or the 
use of investment subsidies – depends on solving the regulator’s commitment problem: the 
regulator would have to be able to commit to the policy for a considerably long period of 
time. The policy rule of “no regulation” suffers from the same time-inconsistency problem as 
any other rule that does not maximise static allocative efficiency, as the regulator would like 
to impose cost-based regulation of access after the investment has been undertaken. 
Investment subsidies can run into similar problems if the incumbent fears that any ex ante 
subsidy will be expropriated by future regulation.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
A. Proof of  0
*
>∂
∂
β
m
:  
From equation (8), the sign of β∂
∂ *m  is given by the sign of ( )( ) ( )γβγγγψβγ −+−−− 2122 c . 
The first part of this expression is negative by the second order condition (7) and by the 
assumption that γβ > . β∂
∂ *m  is therefore positive if the model parameters satisfy the 
condition  
 
( )
( )γγψγβ
γβγ
−+−
−<
12
2
2c  .    (*)  
 
It is shown below that the rivals are active in the market only if condition (13) holds. Now, 
the difference between the RHS of (*) and the RHS of (13) is given by  
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 ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ] ( )[ ]γψβγγψγβ γγψγββγγβ −+−−+− −+−−− 12112 1222
2
, 
 
which is positive given the second order condition (7) and the assumption γβ > . Therefore 
the RHS of (*) is higher than the RHS of (13) and condition (*) holds for all permissible 
parameter values (that is, always when the rivals are active in the market). Hence 0
*
>∂β
m∂
. 
 
 
B. Proof of : *mm so >
After some manipulations, we find that 
 
 ( )( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]γγψγββγγγψγββγ γβγγψ −+−−−+−− −−=− 1423122 12 22
2
* cmmso .   
 
Both terms in the denominator are positive by the second order conditions and as we know 
that 0>− cβγ  has to hold for the optimal investment level to be positive. Therefore 
. 0* >− mmso
 
 
C. Proof of condition (13): 
In order to show that condition (13) is the appropriate condition for the rivals’ output to be 
positive we need to show that that ( ) 0121 >−+− γψβ . Let us first assume that the reverse 
holds, that is, ( ) 0121 <−+− γψβ . This together with our previous condition γβ >  would in 
fact yield a sufficient condition for the rivals to be active in the market. However, in order for 
those two conditions to possibly be consistent, we would need to have that 
2
1<ψ .  With 
2
1<ψ , the expression associated with the second order condition in (7) is smaller than 
, which is equal to ( )γγ −+ 1γβ −2βγ −2 ( ) 022 <−−= γβ2 2 −− γββγ . Therefore 
2
1<ψ   
implies a failure of the second order condition for all values of β  and γ . Therefore, we need 
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to have 
2
1>ψ  for the second order condition to be satisfied and this together with γβ >  
implies that ( ) 0121 >−+− γψβ . Hence the appropriate condition for the rivals’ output to be 
positive in the case of no regulation is given by (13). 
*
Rm>*m
( ) (
2
*
2
11
ββγ
γβ
−−
−−=− mR
*
R
SO
R mm >
( )
( )γψ
βγ
−
−=−
12
212*mR
SO
*
Rm−
( )( γβββ 112 +−−
0>cβ
 
 
D. Proof of : 
After some manipulations, we find that  
 
)( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2* 11212 12)1( βγψγγψγ γγψβγββ −−−−+ −−+−+− ccm .   
 
Both terms in the denominator are positive by the second order conditions and the 
denominator is positive given our assumptions 1<<< βγc . Hence . 0** >− Rmm
 
 
E. Proof of : 
After some manipulations we find that  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( ) ([ ]γγψγγββγββ ββγγγψβγββ −+−+−−− −+−+−+−− 143641 43111 2 ccmR .   )
 
Both terms in the denominator are positive by the second order conditions and therefore the 
sign of  is given by the sign of SORm
 
( ) ) ( )( )cc ββγγγβ 431 −+−+− . 
 
The first half of this expression is positive, given our assumptions 1<< βγ . Therefore a 
sufficient (even though not a necessary) condition for the entire expression to be positive is 
43 −+ βγγ . Further, given our assumption that γ<c , we can make the following 
comparisons:  
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( ) 014343 >−=−+>−+ βγβγβγγββγγ c .  
 
Hence . 0* >− RSOR mm
 
 
 
F. Proof of  γ<fRc :
After some manipulations we find that ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )2112
11
βγψ
γψββγγ −−−
+−−=− fRc , which is larger than 
zero if ( ) 

∈−>
4
,01 γγ
ββψ . We also know that 

∈
4
1,0
4
γ  and (from Appendix C) 
that
2
1>ψ . Therefore, c .   γ<fR
 
 
G. Alternative specification of consumers’ willingness to pay 
 
Assume that a consumer of type ( )1,0∈x
)
 has a willingness to pay (  for the 
incumbent’s service and 
)xm+1
( xmβγ +  for the rivals’ service. Assuming that the incumbent is 
the higher quality firm also after the investment has taken place (that is, mm βγ +>+1 ), the 
demand functions for the incumbent’s and the fringe’s services are given by  
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )mm
p
m
pmppq
m
ppmppq
βγβγβγ
βγ
+−+−−−+−=
−+−
−−=
1111
,,
11
1,,
21
212
21
211
. 
 
In the unregulated case, the incumbent maximises a profit function with the above demands, 
and would optimally set  and ( )mp*1 ( )ma*  to the levels given in (4). However, inserting these 
prices into the above demand functions shows that only the incumbent would have a positive 
demand, and the rivals will therefore exit the market (regardless of the level of investment). 
On the other hand, if the rivals had higher quality after the investment stage (if 
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mm βγ +<+1
caR =
), the incumbent would exit the retail market and would act only as a supplier 
of network services to the fringe firms.  
( )
ψ
ββ
8
41 +−<c
 
In the case with access price regulation, the incumbent’s optimal price as a function of the 
regulated access charge and the investment level is given by (14) and the regulator again sets 
. Given these prices and continuing to assume that the incumbent is the higher quality 
firm, the equilibrium output levels are  and 2/1*,1 =Rq ( ) ( )m
cmmR βγq
βγ
+
−+=
2
2*
,2 . The rivals’ 
output is therefore again increasing in investment. The incumbent’s optimal level of 
investment (with both firms in the market) is ( ) ψβ 4/1−* =Rm
( )
. With this investment level, 
the rivals’ output is ( )( ) γψββ
γψββ
8.
4
+−12
1*
,2
2−+−=q R c . Therefore  only if 0*,2 >Rq
γψ .  
 
Therefore, the main results under access price regulation are robust to this change in 
specification: Access is regulated at marginal cost, investments are decreasing in the level of 
spillovers and they go to zero if 1>β . There is again a range of parameter values where 
investments are so low that the rivals are forced to exit the market.  
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